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paper concludes in Section 7.
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION
Future communication systems must allow ubiquitous con-
nectivity where users are always connected from anywhere
and at any time. The need for continuous connection is
being met by the development and deployment of a number
of wireless technologies including 3G/HSPDA, WLAN [15]
with Long Term Evolution (LTE) [23] and Wimax being the
latest network of being deployed. However with the wide-
scale deployment of wireless networks as end-systems, there
will now be significant differences in network characteris-
tics in terms of bandwidth, latency, packet loss and error
characteristics. These developments imply that the future
Internet will not have a single unified infrastructure rather
it will comprise a fast core network with slower peripheral
networks attached around the core. The core network will
consist of a super-fast backbone using optical switches and
fast access networks which use Multiple Protocol Label
Switching (MPLS). Most of the peripheral networks will be
based on wireless technologies. In this environment, future
mobile terminals will be connected using several network
interface cards (NICs), which enable them to switch between
any of the supported networks while remaining connected to
end servers. This is referred to as seamless Vertical Handover
(VH), which has been under investigation by many research
effort such as the IEEE 802.21 [22] and the Y-Comm group
[7].
This open and multi-homed nature of the Next Generation
Networks (NGNs), make them vulnerable to QoS and secu-
rity threats. On one hand, in this heterogeneous environment,
there is a need for an end-to-end, cross-operators QoS
provision. When users subscribe to a specific service, this
implies that the two end systems have to agree on certain
conditions of using the service, this is known as the Service-
Level of Agreement (SLA). The SLA includes contracted
delivery time (of the service) along with its performance.
In the case of a single operator scenario, where all the
resources are controlled and managed by one administrative
entity, maintaining the SLA would not be an issue. However,
this will not be the case in multiple operators environment,
where the mobile terminal roams among access networks,
controlled by different operators. In this open architecture
each operator has control only over the resources in its own
domain and not the resources of the other domains. There-
fore, when a mobile terminal moves into another domain, the
old operator cannot any more guarantee the agreed on QoS.
To address these threats, different research efforts have
been trying to deal with the QoS issue by proposing frame-
works for End-To-End QoS signalling such as the Daidalos
II and the Y-Comm QoS frameworks [16] [8].
On the other hand, the open and multi-homed nature of the
Next Generation Networks (NGNs), makes them vulnerable
to security threats such as the compromise and resource
exhaustion attacks. While the first takes the victim offline,
the latter leaves the server intact but however overloads it
with a huge volume of traffic and thus preventing it from
serving legitimate clients. These two attacks target service
availability and thus, are categorized as forms of Denial of
Service (DoS) attacks. Due to many factors, these attacks will
become more common in future, heterogeneous networks:
firstly, the concept of global reachability, which has been
adopted in the design of most communication protocols,
allows any host to communicate with any other hosts over the
globe. Secondly, due to the absence of QoS-provision over
the different networks, an attacker can send a huge volume
of traffic towards the victim without any indication of a
QoS-breach. Thirdly, multi-homing issues in future networks
will increase the severity of these attacks in heterogeneous
environments, as malicious, multi-homed devices use several
interfaces, identified by different network addresses to launch
the attack, without having anything to indicate that these
addresses are collocated on the same node.
It is obvious that, the compromise and resource exhaustion
attacks lead to a breach of the agreed SLA. This highlights
the need for an integrated solution that considers the security
and QoS sides of these attacks. Moreover, in order to deal
with the above situation, there is a need for a novel approach
that addresses each of the afore-mentioned factors. Therefore,
to deal with the first factor, the proposed approach in this
paper enhances the concept of the ” Off By Default” [3] ,
which enables the end-hosts or servers to define the nodes
to communicate with and thus, limits servers accessibility
based on their preference. Secondly, in order to deal with
the QoS side of this problem, there is a need to monitor
the utilization of the resources, allocated for the connection
over the different networks and make sure that there is no
breach of the agreed QoS. Therefore, the proposed approach
adopts the structure of heterogeneous networks and the
end-to-end QoS framework, presented in [8]. This structure
defines dedicated network entities to monitor the network’s
utilization and make sure that the Corresponding Node (CN)
cannot exceed the agreed QoS. The third factor is the issue
of multi-homing, which has been investigated by different
research efforts such [9][10][11] [12]. To deal with the multi-
homing issue, new naming service and locating systems,
namely the Enhanced Domain Name System (eDNS) and
the Master Locator (ML) were introduced in [14].
III. QOS AND SECURITY INTEGRATION
QoS and security are two crucial issues in today’s inter-
networking. While security provides proof of identity, pre-
serves data integrity and confidentiality as well as supports
authorized access to the resources, QoS refers to the ability
of providing different priority to different application and
users to guarantee a certain level of the performance to a
data flow. In this sense, QoS mechanisms refer to resource
reservation control mechanisms as well as the performance
of the services.
Security and QoS are not quite independent, since the
choice of security mechanisms may affect the delivery of the
QoS and visa versa. Security mechanisms ensure appropriate
service assignment and billing; a selection of poor security
mechanisms might expose the system and make it vulnerable
to security threats such as Denial of Service Attack (DoS)
which, will reduce the performance of the network or end
servers, while inappropriate QoS selection might be in con-
flict with the security level and lead to a security breach.
For instance, providing a very high performance for some
time-sensitive service, might require reducing the level of
the service security. This interaction implies that, both QoS
and security must be considered together when designing
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and implementing a network infrastructure to achieve the
best possible security and QoS level. In order to support
this integration between QoS and security, the concept of
Quality of Security Service (QoSS) has been investigated
by different research efforts such as [25] [26] [27]. The
QoSS represents adaptive security enforcement mechanisms
that support dynamic security policies and services, it can
be applied to computing and communication systems at
all levels of technology, from applications to base proto-
cols and architectures and encompasses many aspects of
security research, including Quality of Protection, Adaptive
Security, Dynamic Security, Policy-Based Access Control.
In this concept security has been managed as a dimension
of Quality of Service with the aim of leveraging existing
security mechanisms to improve availability, predictability,
and efficiency, while maintaining, if not increasing the overall
security.
However, such integration between the QoS and security
within the concept of QoSS has to be carefully considered.
Since QoS involves users requesting for variable levels of
services, that are related to the performance of the underlying
systems, for security to be a real part of QoS, security choices
must be presented to users, and the QoS mechanism must
be able to modulate related variables to provide predictable
security service levels to those users. By introducing variable
level of security parameters, for example, different encryp-
tion and authentication mechanisms and variable length of
keys, results in additional parameters, the QoS mechanism
has to consider as well as solve any conflict in order to meet
overall user and system demands, as well as balance costs
and projected benefits to specific users/clients. Nevertheless,
considering the various levels of security as a dimension of
the QoS mechanism means that it can adapt more gracefully
to dynamic changes in resource availability, and thereby do
a better job at maintaining requested or required levels of
service in all of its dimensions, which is in essence is the
premise of QoSS.
IV. PROVIDING QOS IN HETEROGENEOUS
ENVIRONMENTS
This section describes our work, which has recently
been presented in [8], to propose a QoS framework in
heterogeneous environments. The section starts by briefly
viewing a potential structure of future networks along with its
operational entities, it then explains the three targeted QoS-
Signalling models, which are responsible for providing QoS
in different scenarios.
A. Overview of Future Networks
Unlike the closed environments in current mobile systems
(2/3G), the core network in future systems will not be
controlled by a sole operator [17], rather multiple operators
will coexist in the core network and provide clients with
ubiquitous connectivity. However, since each network oper-
ator uses a different network architecture, interoperability is
the major challenging problem.
One proposed solution to this problem is having a central
management entity to control the resource of the all dif-
ferent technologies and coordinate the multiple operators.
Fig. 1. Future Internet Structure
The concept of a central management entity was recom-
mended by the ITU-T recommendation for NGN as in [21].
The recommendation proposes the concept of Regulatory
Authority which controls different network operators and
service providers. The Regulatory Authorities are regulatory
bodies with the power to influence policies in telecommu-
nication services, they are responsible for creating national
policies to encourage the development of telecommunica-
tions, also they provide essential powers to regulate license
agreements, interconnection arrangements, and monitoring
unlawful telecommunication activities.
This concept of a central management entity in the local
area was adopted and enhanced by the Y-Comm group [20]
and Daidalos II [16] which introduced the concept of the
Core End-Point (CEP) in [8] as an administrative domain
for multiple, technology-specific networks. As shown in
Fig 1, the future Internet could be viewed as composed
of several Core End-Points, interconnected over the super
fast backbone of the Internet. Each CEP is responsible for
managing multiple, wireless peripheral networks such as
Wimax, WiFi or cellular technologies.
A detailed view of the network along with its components
are explained in the [8] and shown in Fig 2. It is a hierarchical
structure of the network composed of three levels. The top
level is the Core End-Point (CEP) which acts as a gateway to
the Internet and is responsible for managing multiple, mid-
level domains. Each domain is technology-specific and is
controlled by a single operator. For instance the CEP might
be connected to two domains, each is controlled by different
technology operator such as WiMAX and GSM. The bottom
level is the peripheral wireless networks, represented by
multiple Access Routers (ARs), which make the interface
between the network and the mobile terminal (MT).
Although the structure in Fig 2 is for future networks,
it was evolved from the architecture of current systems; for
instance, the technologies-specific domains in the mid-level
correspond to the circuit switching and packet switching
core networks in the GSM and GPRS or UMTS. The
major difference is that the proposed structure proposes an
open architecture, where different technologies and operators
could join the network. However, to control this open archi-
tecture, the Core End-Point in the top-level must manage the
resources in all various domains.
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Fig. 2. Detailed network Structure
B. Supporting an End-To-End QoS in Heterogeneous Net-
works
As shown in Fig 2, in order to deal with the QoS and
security tasks in this architecture, a number of operational
entities have been proposed as follows:
• The Central A3C server (CA3C): This is the cen-
tral Authentication, Authorization; Accounting and Cost
(A3C) server in the Core End-Point. The CA3C holds
the Service Level of Agreements (SLAs) along with the
Network Level of Agreements (NLAs), which describe
the clients’ term of use of the service and access
networks, respectively.
• The Central QoS Broker (CQoSB): is responsible for
negotiating QoS in case of cross-CEP handover.
• The Domain A3C Server (DA3C): The DA3C is
responsible for handling users’ service aspects. Initially,
it extracts user profile information from the CA3C and
uses this information for authorizing the users’ requests
to access services..
• The Domain QoS Broker (DQoSB): manages the re-
sources of the attached peripheral networks with respect
user preferences and network availability, it also makes
a per-flow admission control decision.
• The Access Router (AR): This is the link between
the domain and the peripheral networks; it enforces the
admission control decision, taken by the DQoSB. Since
the AR acts as a relay between the Mobile Terminal
(MT) in the peripheral network and the DA3C, using
security terminology, the AR will be referred to as the
Authenticator (Auth).
Although, a detailed explanation of the structure of these
components has been introduced in [8], for the sake of this
paper and in order to explain the proposed security model we
need to briefly recall the structure of the CQoSB, DQoSBs
and the Access Routers (ARs), which are among the key
entities for the operation of the proposed security model.
As shown in Fig 3, the CQoSB comprises three modules:
the QoSB Engine manages inter-domain connection and
provides end-to-end QoS across administrative domains, the
A3C interface is used for the interaction with the CA3C
server. The High-level Access Admission (HAAD) module
makes a per connection access control policy which will be
passed to other operational entities in the network such as
Fig. 3. The Central QoS Broker Structure
Fig. 4. The Domain QoS Broker Structure
Fig. 5. The Access Router Structure
the DQoSBs and the ARs.
Fig 4 presents the structure of the DQoSB which com-
prises five interfaces. However, in this section we are only
concerned about the Access Admission Decision (AAD)
module; details about the other interfaces are found in [8].
The AAD acts as a proxy for the HAAD, and provides the
AAE in the AR with policy- related decisions.
As shown in Fig 5, the AR comprises four interfaces:
the QoS Manager (QoSM), the A3C interface; the Access
Admission Enforcement (AAE) which enforces the access
decision taken by the HAAD and the Network Monitoring
Entity (NME)
For the connection between the AAE and AAD, there is
a need for a policy information and configuration exchange
protocol such Common Open Policy Service (COPS) [18],
where the AR acts as an AAE and the an AAD.
These entities cooperate to provide security and QoS-
related tasks. However, since there is a need for QoS pro-
vision in different situations, three QoS-Signalling models
have been proposed in [8]:
• The Registration Model: describes the procedure fol-
lowed when the MT first attaches to the peripheral
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Fig. 6. The Initial Registration Model
network. This model basically involves Authenticating
the MT to use the network, then enforcing the access
control policies based on the MT’s SLA.
Initially, upon subscribing to the service, the user and
the Central QoS Broker (CQoSB) share the details of
SLAs which include the subscribed services and the
type of the access network along with corresponding
range of the desired security and QoS. As shown in
Fig 6, once the mobile terminal is authenticated to
access the network, the Access Admission Enforcement
(AAE) module in the Access Router requests a user-
specific Access Decision (AD Req) from the Access
Admission Decision (AAD) module in the Domain QoS
Broker. Since, this is an initial registration model, the
AAD approaches the High level AAD (HAAD), which
extract the user’s profile from the QoSB Engine and
passes the decision - via (AD Res) message- all the
way back to the AAE module of the Access Router.
The access policy is configured on the access router
and an acknowledgement is sent back to the AAD.
• The Connection Initiation Model: deals with the case
when the MT starts a connection to a server SP. It
involves authorizing the connection request in both the
source and the destination networks and making sure
that it complies with the pre-agreed on QoS.
As shown in Fig 7 shows a scenario of a mobile terminal
MT willing to communicate with a server (S), where
they are both residing in the same Core End-Point
(Administrative Domain) but in different domains. The
procedure starts when the MT expresses its intention
by sending an Access Request with the desired QoS.
However, before the MT could use the network, its
request has to be authorized; therefore, using the A3C
interface, the Access Router issues an Authorization
Request (Auth.Req) with the QoS, required by the MT.
The Central QoS broker and the A3C in the Core End
Fig. 7. The Connection Initiation Model
Point will check the parameters in Auth.Req and based
on the MT’s SLA and the capabilities of the network,
the request might be rejected or accepted. In case of
acceptance, similar check has to be carried out for the
destination network (the server’s network). Once this
is achieved, layer 2 resources in both networks are
prepared to accommodate the connection.
• The Handover Model: This step explains the QoS
provision in the case of Inter and Intra administra-
tive domain handover. Fig 8 shows the case of Intra-
Core End-Point handover, where the MT moves be-
tween different domains within the same Core End-
Point(Administrative Domain), this model deploys the
Pre-Authentication (Pre-AKA) protocol to achieve Pre-
Authentication and Key Agreement as well as launching
the security materials in the target network before
the actual handover takes place and thus, reduce the
disturbance to the handover caused by the security
mechanisms. Also in this step, the QoS-context is
transferred and used by the access control mechanism in
the new network to enforce the right access admission
policy. After configuring the access policy in the target
Access Router, it starts L2 resources reservation and a
successful handover response message is sent back to
MT to trigger the actual handover.
In the case of an Inter-Core End-Point handover, the
user’s SLA details are moved to the new Core End-
Point; thus, the MTs related information becomes avail-
able in the target network. Then similar to the Intra-
Handover scenario, access admission policy is config-
ured and enforced by the AR and an acknowledgement
is sent back to the MT to start the actual handover.
More details about these models are found in [8].
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Fig. 8. The Intra-Handover Model
V. LIMITING SERVERS ACCESSIBILITY OVER THE
INTERNET
One obvious solution to deal with the compromise and
resource exhaustion attacks, which compromise the security
and reduce the performance of the systems, is by controlling
access to the victim. The literature is rich with mechanisms
that have attempted to hide the server’s identity and limit its
accessibility, some of which are as follows:
A. Access Control Lists and Firewalls
One of the earliest attempts to enforce access control
was by configuring ACLs on the network’s routers, ACLs
provide basic packet filtering to protect the networks from
the outside world [5]; they filter the traffic and based on pre-
configured criteria such as the Source/destination IP address
or ports numbers, they will forward or block packets on the
interface routers. As stated in [5], configuring ACLs on the
edge routers could mitigate many threats such as IP spoofing
and DoS TCP SYN flooding. However, configuring ACLs is
an error-prone procedure and for each traffic type a new rule
has to be added. Additionally, ACLs perform stateless packet
inspection without considering the state of the whole session.
Firewalls address the shortages of basic ACLs, provide
layered defence mechanisms; perform stateful packet in-
spection and have application awareness for a few transport
protocols. This offers a higher level of protection than basic
packet filtering. The firewalls also consider the state of the
connection and thus, differentiate between packets belonging
to different sessions. However, the problem with the firewall
is that, it breaks a single session into two connections which,
can have detrimental effects on end-to-end performance.
B. Network Address Translation
The idea of hiding the identity of the servers from external
entities was initially proposed by the Network Address
TABLE I
A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE RELATED APPROACHES
The Mechanism Advantages Disadvantages
ACLs Mitigates IP spoofing
and DoS TCP SYN
flooding
Provides only state-
less packet inspec-
tion.
Firewalls Support layered de-
fence mechanism and
stateful packet filter-
ing
Break the end-to-
end connection’s
property, adds-on
security mechanism
that is vulnerable to
configuration error
NAT Less administrative
effort, was the first to
hide the identity of
the server rather than
preventing packets
from getting to it
Contradicts with the
end-to-end concept,
interoperability
problems with
the Firewalls and
newer version of IP
addresses.
Off By Default More integrated than
the previous mecha-
nisms
Place a burden on
the network infras-
tructure, Not fully in-
tegrated.
Translation (NAT) [1] where the NAT server acts as an IP
converter that maps private IP addresses (the ones used in
the internal network) to globally, registered addresses, in an
attempt to allow hosts in private networks to transparently
communicate with external hosts and visa versa.
However, the implementation of the NAT does not come
without potential drawbacks. For instance, the connection
between the hosts residing behind the NAT is broken on the
first NAT-supporting router; this contradicts with the end-
to-end concept which used to be the core principle of the
current Internet [4]. Additionally, there are serious concerns
about the operability of the NAT and Firewalls as well as the
scalability of the NAT database.
C. Off By Default
To reduce the complexity and the overhead resulting
from implementing the previous mechanisms, the authors in
[3] proposed an integrated, access control-based approach
through which, the host explicitly specifies the traffic it wants
routed to it; thus defining its reachability. In this approach,
the routers will not automatically route the packets unless
explicitly directed to do so by the destination host.
This proposal however suffers from a number of draw-
backs: Firstly, this approach requires the network to maintain
accessibility information for each destination, this might
place a burden on the network infrastructure. Secondly, the
end host should be able to regulate its reachability for a wide
spectrum of applications and protocols, update it in case of
any modification, and then convey this information to the
access router in a systematic way. Table I summarizes the
pros and cons of the access control mechanisms.
Although, the approach of ”Off By Default” has addressed
many drawbacks of the primitive access control mechanisms,
for this approach to be deployed in future heterogeneous
networks, it requires major modifications and enhancements
such as:
1) Currently, with the ”Off By Default”, the server could
choose the hosts it wants to accept traffic from, this
approach is not scalable. To deal with this situation, it
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might be better for the server to set more general rules
to determine its accessibility rather than specifying
access rules per host.
2) Although, the ”Off By Default” provided a certain
degree of integration, the server still needs to explicitly
specify its reachability to the gateway router which
will propagate this to all routers via routing table
update procedure. We agree that the gateway router
must be aware of the server’s accessibility, however,
the process of conveying this information outside the
network should be accomplished with a minimum
involvement of the server. Additionally, we believe
that only concerned entities should know the server’s
accessibility.
3) Considering the multi-homed nature of future devices,
where a multi-homed device might choose to access
the server over a different interface and using a new
IP address, which is not known for the server. In such
cases, the device will be banned from accessing the
server although, it is eligible for it. Or in contrast,
a multi-homed device might succeed in connecting
to the server using different network interfaces with
different IP addresses, and reserves more resource than
it requires.
4) After making the connection, there is a need for
monitoring the utilization of the network resources and
making sure that there will not be a violation of the
agreed SLA.
These points highlight the need for a new approach that
could work effectively in the multi-homed, heterogeneous
environments.
VI. LIMITING SERVERS ACCESSIBILITY IN
HETEROGENEOUS ENVIRONMENT USING THE SCOPE
CONCEPT
This section presents our proposed security model to limit
the reachability servers in heterogeneous environments such
as the one shown in Fig 2. Although the proposed model
is based on the ” Off By Default” concept, it has avoided
most of its drawbacks such as being fully integrated with the
network infrastructure. It also introduced new enhancements
by considering the multi-homing and QoS issues.
However, the proposed mode benefited from some recent
research of our group, which has been trying to address issues
such as the multi-homing.
A. Investigating the Multi-Homing issue in Future Networks
In recent work of the Y-Comm group [13][14], the impact
of multi-homed devices on current network addresses and
structure has been investigated. The outcome highlighted the
need for a new approach to map multiple network interfaces
to the hosting device, thus a novel addressing scheme has
been introduced in[13]. Additionally, major changes to loca-
tion and naming systems such as the Home Location Register
(HLR) and the Domain Name System (DNS) [19][6] have
been introduced in [14].
Fig 9 shows the novel addressing scheme, the 128-bit
long address has three portions: the Location ID defines
the domain of the mobile node (MN), the Node ID is a
64-bit used to identify the node and is assigned by the
Fig. 9. The New Addressing Scheme
TABLE II
THE EDNS RECORD
Internet
Name
Node ID S M SF Location ID ML’s Ad-
dress
Name1 Node ID1 1 0 01 Location ID1 ML- Add
Name2 Node ID2 1 0 10 Location ID2.1
Location ID2.2
ML- Add
Name3 Node ID3 0 0 11 Location ID3 ML- Add
Name4 Node ID4 0 0 10 Location ID4.1
Location ID4.2
Location ID4.3
Location ID4.4
ML- Add
manufacturer. Among the fields of the NetAdmin part is the
2-bit Scope Field (SF) which is responsible for defining the
node accessibility as follow:
• SF=00: indicates that the node could only be accessed
by processes on the same machine.
• SF=01: defines a LAN scope which means that the node
could be accessed from only the devices belonging to
its LAN network.
• SF=10: denotes that only devices residing in the same
site as the node could get access.
• SF=11: means that the device is globally accessible.
To support the new addresses and deals with the multi-
homing issue, there is a need for major changes to the DNS
and the location systems. Therefore, in [14] the group has
proposed the concept of the Enhanced DNS (eDNS) and the
Master Locator (ML), respectively. Similarly to the current
DNS, the eDNS is still responsible for resolving Addresses
to names and visa-versa. However, as shown in Table II, to
support the new addressing scheme, there is a need to have
more information about the node launched in the naming
system. Examples of this information is the scope field (SF),
the M and S fields, which are taken from the NetField
portion of the address and indicate whether the destination
is static and represent a multicast address. The ML is an
evolved version of the Home Location Register HLR and is
responsible for tracking the mobile terminal over different
networks, Table III shows the structure of the ML.
B. The Proposed Security Model
In order to address the shortages of ”Off By Default”
and to provide a systematic approach to define and enforce
servers’ reachability, we introduce the scope concept, which
limits servers’ visibility over the network based on their
functionality. The approach benefits from the new addressing
IAENG International Journal of Computer Science, 38:4, IJCS_38_4_08
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TABLE III
THE MASTER LOCATOR RECORD
Node ID Location ID INF Mobility
Vector
QoS Specifi-
cations
Node ID1 Location ID1.1
Location ID1.2
INF1.1
INF1.2
Value1
Value2
QoS-Spec1
QoS-Spec2
Node ID2 Location ID2.1
Location ID2.2
INF2.1
INF2.2
Value3
Value4
QoS-Spec3
QoS-Spec4
Fig. 10. Enforcing the Reachability Based on the Scope
scheme in section VI-A and uses the SF field to define the
server scope.
However, for the proposed security model to work in
future, heterogeneous environment such as the one in section
IV-A, the SF field in the new address must be redefined and
mapped to the network structure in Fig 2. In this structure
of the network, a server could be local, accessed by client in
the same peripheral network or by clients residing within the
Core-End Point (CEP). The server might also be global and
thus, accessible globally over the Internet. By considering
the value of the (SF) field in the addressing scheme, the four
scopes could be redefined as follows:
• SF=00: indicates that the node could only access locally
via mechanism such as the loopback interfaces.
• SF=01: defines a LAN scope which means that the host
could be accessed by the nodes in the same peripheral
network. So the location ID should be the local LAN.
• SF=10: denotes that the host could only be accessed by
devices residing within the same Core End-Point. So
Location ID must be a site Address.
• SF=11: means that the device is globally accessible over
the Internet.
The following sections explain how the servers’ acces-
sibility could be implemented and enforced using the new
addressing scheme and the hierarchical network structure.
1) The host registration and devising the Access Policy :
As shown Fig 10, in this stage, the hosts register themselves
in a global naming system such as the proposed eDNS along
with the corresponding Scope Field’s value that reflects their
scope, this information is passed to the High-level Access
Admission (HAAD) module in the Central QoS Broker
Fig. 11. Enforcing the Reachability Based on the Scope
(CQoSB). The HAAD uses the defined scope along with
the Service Level of Agreement (SLA) information, retrieved
from the QoS Engine to devise an Access Control Policy
(ACP). The ACP is passed from the HAAD all the way to
the Access Admission Enforcement (AAE) module in the
Access Router (AR) using policy-conveying protocols such
as the COPS protocol.
2) Enforcing the Access Policy: At the end of the previous
stage, the end-hosts should have been registered with the
eDNS along with their desired accessibility. Additionally,
based on the accessible scope and other QoS-related infor-
mation, an access policy will be devised by the HAAD and
transferred to the enforcement module in the AR which will,
based on the policy, accept or drop access requests.
Fig 11 shows the transaction in the case of the Correspond-
ing Node (CN) trying to connect to a mobile node (MN). For
this scenario, we presume that, MN’s scope might be any of
the LAN, Domain or Global.
• Msg1: The CN asks the eDNS sever for MN’s address.
• Msg2: The eDNS uses the MN’s name to look up its
database and since the MN is a multi-homed device,
its name will be resolved to different addresses with
the same Node ID, this implies that the MN is ac-
cessible over different routes/ networks. However, the
eDNS cannot define the best route for the connection.
Therefore, the eDNS returns the MN’s Node ID and the
address of the Master Locator( ML) that manages the
mobility of MN.
• Msg3: The CN polls the ML to find out the different net-
works to which the MN is currently attached. The ML
approaches the CQoSB to get QoS-related information
about the MN’s different networks. Upon receiving this
information, the ML sets the INF bits and thus maps
the Location ID to the interface address.
• Msg4: A list of MN’s Location IDs along with their
QoS specifications is passed to the CN, which chooses
the route to the MN and thus defines the corresponding
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Location ID.
• Msg5: Since the CN has the MN’s full address, the CN
can start the connection by sending Access Request to
the MN. This request will be intercepted by the AR in
the source network which checks the Scope Field in the
destination address. Based on the SF value, if MN was
accessible for CN the access request packet is forwarded
otherwise, it is dropped.
• Msg6 When the access request gets to the destination
network, the AR will check whether the request com-
plies with the access policy or not. If the request passes
the check, the AR passes it to the MN.
However, before the CN could use the service on MN, there
is a need to achieve mutual authentication and set a secure
session between the CN and the MN. This could be achieved
using Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) protocols
similar to the one in [2]
3) Model Analysis and Attacks Modelling: This section
will describe different attack scenarios and show how our
security model react to them.
• The first scenario is the case of a Denial Of Service
(DOS) Attack where a single Corresponding Node (CN)
is trying to access a server with a LAN/Site scope.
Obviously, if the CN was not in the server’s scope,
its connection request will be dropped by the Access
Routers. Otherwise, it could communicate with the
server. However, if the CN initially claims more QoS
than it is allowed to, this will be detected by the Access
Admission Enforcement (AAE) as violation to the ac-
cess policy. Furthermore, after making the connection,
if the CN tries to abuse the network and exceeds the
reserved QoS, this will be detected by the Network
Monitoring Entity (NME) module in the Access Router,
consequently, the CN will be blacklisted.
• A similar discussion applies if the server was global.
• The third scenario considers the case of a Distributed
Denial of Service (DDOS) attack where multiple corre-
sponding nodes attempt to access a server with LAN or
Site scope. Only corresponding nodes in the scope of
the server could communicate with the server. However,
in the case where a large number of legitimate nodes
managed to access the server, they could overload the
server and launch a DDOS attack despite the fact that
none of the nodes has individually exceeded the agreed
QoS.
• In case of a server with a global scope, the previous
DDOS attack could still be achievable.
Furthermore, by deploying the new address scheme in Sec-
tion VI-A, which uses the Node ID to identify the device,
if a multi-homed CN attempts to start multiple sessions with
the server using different network interfaces, the network and
thus the server will be able to co-locate these sessions to the
same CN and thus monitor the resources utilization over the
different sessions. Table IV summarizes the analysis result.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper introduces a novel security model to limit
servers accessibility over heterogeneous environments, which
will help in mitigating some serious security threats such
as denial of service attacks. This model adopts the QoSS
TABLE IV
ANALYSIS SUMMARY
Scope DOS DDOS
LAN/ Site Fully Mitigated Still Possible
Global Fully Mitigated Partially Mitigated
concept to integrate security and QoS, it also benefits from
recent enhancements on network services such as the en-
hanced DNS and Location servers to support the integration
with the network infrastructure. The analysis section shows
that, the proposed model succeeds in stopping DoS attacks
while is partially effective in addressing Distributed DOS
attacks.
REFERENCES
[1] P. Srisuresh and M. Holdrege, ”IP Network Address Translator (NAT)
Terminology and Considerations”. RFC 2663, August 1999.
[2] M. Aiash, G. Mapp, A. Lasebae, R. Phan, J. Loo,”A Formally
Verified Initial AKA Protocol in Heterogeneous Environments Using
Casper/FDR (Submitted For Publication)”, International Journal of
Information Security, Springer.
[3] H. Ballani, Y. Cathwathe, S. Ratnasamy, T. Roscoe and S. Shenker,
”Off by Default”.Proc.the 4th Workshop on Hot Topics in Networking
(HotNets-II). 2005
[4] R. Bush and D. Meyer, ”Some Internet Architectural Guidelines and
Philosophy”. RFC 3439, December 2002.
[5] C. Paquet, ”Authorized Self-Study Guide Implementing Cisco IOS
Network Security (IINS)” Indianapolis, USA: Cisco Press, 2009.
[6] P. Mockapetris, ”DOMAIN NAMES - IMPLEMENTATION AND
SPECIFICATION”. RFC 1035, November 1987.
[7] G. Mapp, F. Shaikh, M. Aiash, R. P.Vanni, M. Augusto and E. Moreira,
”Exploring Efficient Imperative Handover Mechanisms for Heteroge-
neous Wireless Networks” ,Proc. International Symposium on Emerging
Ubiquitous and Pervasive Systems (EUPS-09) August 2009.
[8] M. Aiash, G. Mapp, A. Lasebae, ” A QoS Framework for Hetero-
geneous Networking”, Lecture Notes in Engineering and Computer
Science: Proceedings of The World Congress on Engineering 2011,
WCE 2011, 6-8 July, 2011, London, U.K., pp1765-1769.
[9] M. O’Dell, ”GSE - An Alternate Addressing Architecture for
IPv6”,Internet Draft, 1997.
[10] R. Stewart, ”Stream Control Transmission Protocol”, RFC 4960, 2007.
[11] I. Ishiyama, K. Uehara, H. Esaki and F. Teraoka, ”LINA: A New
Approach to Mobility in Wide Area Networks”, Proc. IEICE Trans.
Commun., August 2001.
[12] M. Kunishi, M. Ishiyama, K. Uehara, H. Esaki and F. Teraoka, ”LIN6:
A New Approach to Mobility Support in IPv6”, Proc. the International
Symposium on Wireless Personal Multimedia Communication, 2006.
[13] G. Mapp, M. Aiash, H. C.Guardia and J. Crowcroft, ”Exploring Multi-
homing Issues in Heterogeneous Environments”,Proc. 1st International
Workshop on Protocols and Applications with Multi-Homing Support
(PAMS’11). Singapore.2011.
[14] M. Aiash, G. Mapp, A. Lasebae and R. Phan, M. Augusto, R. Vanni,
E. Moreira, ”Enhancing Naming and Location Services to support
Multi-homed Devices in Heterogeneous Environments”, Proc. The
CCSIE 2011, London-UK, 25-27 July 2011.
[15] S. Jochen, ”Mobile Communications”. Addison Wesley, 2003
[16] M. Almeida, D. Corujo, S. Sargento, V. Jesus, and R. Aguiar, ”An
End-to-End QoS Framework for 4G Mobile Heterogeneous Environ-
ments”, OpenNet Workshop (2007).
[17] P. Chandra, ”Bulletproof wireless security : GSM, UMTS, 802.11 and
ad hoc security”. Newnes. Oxford, pp. 129-158, 2005.
[18] D. Durham, Ed, J. Boyle, R. Cohen, S. Herzog, R. Rajan, A. Sastry,
”The COPS (Common Open Policy Service) Protocol”. RFC 2748.
2000.
[19] J.H. Schiller, ”Mobile communications”, 2nd ed. London, England:
Addison-Wesley, 2003.
[20] Y-Comm Research. http://www.mdx.ac.uk/research/areas/\software/
ycomm research.aspx. [Accessed 19 August 2011].
[21] International Telecommunication Union (ITU), ”Guideline for at-
tributes and requirements for interconnection between public telecom-
munication network operators and service providers involved in provi-
sion of telecommunication services”, ITU-T Recommendation Y.140.1,
2004.
IAENG International Journal of Computer Science, 38:4, IJCS_38_4_08
(Advance online publication: 12 November 2011)
 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
[22] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. IEEE 802.21/D8.0,
”Draft Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Media
Independent Handover Services”,2007.
[23] Long Term Evolution Protocol Overview, Freescale Semicon-
ductor,2008. http://www.freescale.com/files/wireless comm/doc/white\
paper/LTEPTCLOVWWP.pdf. [Accessed 19 August 2011].
[24] D. Burgess and H. Samra, ”The Open BTS Project”,August 3, 2008.
http://www.ahzf.de/itstuff/papers/OpenBTSProject.pdf
[25] T. E. Levin., C. E. Irvine., and E. Spyropoulou, ”Quality of Security
Service: Adaptive Security”, The Handbook of Information Security,
John Wiley and Sons. December 2005.
[26] E. Spyropoulou., T. E. Levin., C. E. Irvine., ”Calculating costs for
quality of security service”, Proceedings of the 16th Computer Security
Applications Conference, New Orleans, LA, December 2000, pp. 334-
343
[27] T. E. Levin., C. E. Irvine., ”Quality of Security Service”, Proceedings
of the New Security Paradigms Workshop, Ballycotton, Ireland, 18-22,
September 2000.
Mahdi Aiash This author received his BEng
degree in Computer Engineering from Aleppo
University, Syria in 2004 and a Master Degree
(MSc COMPUTER AND NETWORK SECU-
RITY) from Middlesex University, London, UK
in 2008. Currently, he is working towards a PhD
in Security For future Heterogeneous Networks at
Middlesex University.
He is a member of the Y-Comm research group
and has participated in many conferences such as
AICT’10 and ICWN’11 as a reviewer and session
chair. In addition to a number of publications in reputable conferences
and journals such as SECRYPT 2010, IEEE and Springer, he has a dozen
of technical qualifications mainly related to Networking and Information
Security.
Mr. Aiash is an Associate member of the IEEE and IEEE ComSoc since
2008. His paper titled ”A QoS Framework for Heterogeneous Networking”
has been selected for the Best Student Paper Award of The 2011 Interna-
tional Conference of Wireless Networks in London.
Glenford Mapp This author received his PhD
from the Computer Laboratory, University of Cam-
bridge in 1992.
He is also a Principal Lecturer in Computer
Networks at Middlesex University in North Lon-
don and a Visiting Fellow in the LCE Tech-
nology Group at the Computer Laboratory, Uni-
versity of Cambridge. He worked on a num-
ber of networking-oriented projects and proposed
the X-Windows Teleporting project, which later
evolved into Virtual Network Computing, http:
//www.realvnc.com. He also led the early stages of the CLAN project, which
developed very low latency networking technology for the local area. A new
company in Cambridge called Level 5 Networks http://www.level5networks.
com is bringing some exciting new low latency networking products to
the marketplace. He is the chief architect of Y-Comm, a new architec-
ture for future mobile communications systems. See:http://www.mdx.ac.uk/
research/areas/software/ycomm research.aspx. He is working, along with
his colleagues at Middlesex, on developing performance models for mobile
and distributed architectures. Currently he is working on proactive vertical
handover algorithms, network memory storage systems, flexible transport
protocols and network resilience.
Dr. Mapp is a Cambridge Commonwealth Fellow and a member of British
Computer Society.
Aboubaker Lasebae This author got his BASc
from the University Regina, Canada and his MSc
from the University of Southampton, England and
PhD from Middlesex University.
Currently, he is a principal lecturer at the School
of Engineering and Information Systems and the
director of postgraduate programmes for Computer
Communications and the programme Leader of
Computer and Network Security. He has several
publications in the areas of QoS, Network Security,
Wireless Networks and Mobile IP.
Dr. Lasebae is a member of the Institute of Electrical and Electronic
Engineering (MIEEE) since 1985, and of The British Computer society
(BCS) since 2009.
IAENG International Journal of Computer Science, 38:4, IJCS_38_4_08
(Advance online publication: 12 November 2011)
 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
